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A Critical Analysis of Joint Board




A proposal to create regional planning boards for electric utility
holding companies is a recent example of state and industry desires
for increased federal-state coordination.1 Under this proposal, public
utilities commissions in states served by a multistate electric holding
company could propose an integrated resource plan that considers
the existing facilities, the construction of new ones, and the alterna-
tives available through conservation or renewable energy sources.
2
The Senate has conducted hearings into a revised version of the
proposal. 3 Likewise, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(Commission) has requested comment on the similar use of regional
state-federal boards.*
States have presented similar proposals since the 1920s, when the
United States Supreme Court decided that the states lacked the au-
thority to regulate the sale or transmission of power in interstate
* Associate Professor, The Ohio State University.
1. Agreement on Regional Regulation Reached by Energy Regulators, ELECTRIC
UTIL. WK., Sept. 16, 1991, at 10; Arkansas, Energy Air Regional Integrated Resource-
Planning Scheme, INSIDE F.E.R.C., Sept. 16, 1991, at 9. The proposal is substantially
contained in S. 2607, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
2. Arkansas Public Service Commission, Restoring State Regulation: A Legislative
Proposal For Resource Planning By Registered Holding Companies, at 4 (undated press
release).
3. The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources conducted hearings
on S. 2607, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) in May 1992.
4. Notice of Public Conference and Request for Comments on Electricity Issues,
55 F.E.R.C. 11 61,069, 61,200 (1991) (Trabandt, Comm'r, concurring).
commerce. 5 Apart from the regulatory problems that decision cre-
ated (which were largely solved by the 1935 amendments to the Fed-
eral Power Act), the planning aspects remain. Both in 19677 and
1980,8 federal authorities noted the need for additional regional co-
ordination. Likewise, the states have requested federal-state coordi-
nation for nearly every major issue that was raised in the turbulent
1970s and 1980s.9 Despite the seeming congruence between federal
and state views on the need for regional regulation, little sustained
effort toward that goal has occurred. 10
A partial explanation for the lack of regional regulation stems
from jurisdictional limitations on state and federal authority. The
states alone may not regulate the sale and transmission of electricity
on a regional basis,'1 and their authority to coordinate construction
and price electricity purchased in interstate transactions is highly
circumscribed.' 2 Likewise, the Commission lacks the key powers over
transmission and siting that would be necessary to coordinate fully
5. Public Util. Comm'n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83(1927). One of the more significant proposals emerged from the National Governors'
Association and called for a restructuring of Commission jurisdiction and more regional
control through compacts. National Governors' Ass'n, Comm. on Energy and Envt., An
Analysis of Options for Structural Reform in Electric Utility Regulation (1983). For a
summary of the report and the congressional response to it, see DOUGLAS N. JONES ET
AL., REGIONAL REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES 170-
79 (1992).
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824k (1988). The authority was transferred to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission in 1978. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7172(a)(1)(B), 7293 (1988).
7. STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. MACAVOY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 89-121 (1974) (summary of findings of the 1967 National
Power Survey).
8. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF ENERGY, THE NATIONAL POWER GRID STUDY 71
(1980).
9. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
10. The significant exceptions on a national scale, and essentially voluntary on the
industry's part, are the electric reliability councils. The councils provide for the regional
coordination of plants in service so as to maintain the electric grid and avoid the pros-
pects of major cascading outages such as that which occurred in New York in 1965.
CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 585-86 (2d ed. 1988).
Another significant regional planning process that has served as a model for others is the
Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council. The agency is cre-
ated by a federal-state compact and prepares a regional power and conservation plan. 16
U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1988). See Seattle Master Builders Assoc. v. Pacific Nw. Elec.
Power and Conserv. Council, 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding constitutionality
of the Council and approving the conservation plan). See generally David L. Shapiro,
Policy and Legal Conflicts in Pacific Northwest Power, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 14, 1985,
at 19-25.
11. Public Util. Comm'n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83
(1927).
12. Mississippi Power and Light Co. v. Mississippi, ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354(1988) (state may not review the prudence of the decision to continue construction of
nuclear power plant owned by member of interstate holding company); Nantahala Power
and Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986) (state commission may not reallocate
the power sales ordered by the Commission).
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the regional activities of a holding company."l Thus, coordinated ef-
forts have resulted only from extraordinary measures such as inter-
state compacts.' 4
But even if Congress broadened the Commission's authority, some
significant institutional biases would remain because the Commission
refuses to use its existing authority to create regional boards.15 Al-
though Congress provided for several cooperative devices, such as
joint boards, conferences, and hearings,' 6 to deal with the divisions
of federal and state authority in the Federal Power Act, through its
rules and practice the Commission has refused to use the cooperative
procedures. The reasons for denying their use range from supposed
jurisdictional limitations to assertions of administrative discretion.' 7
The Commission's refusal to incorporate regional boards in deci-
sion making may be criticized on several different levels. First, inter-
pretive criticism suggests that the policy is not consistent with the
Commission's legislative mandate.' 8 Second, the rationales justifying
its position are not convincing when tested against traditional or rep-
resentational models of agency decision making.' 9 Even though the
failure of the Commission to use regional boards may reflect some
legitimate concerns about the political limits of regional decision
making, the Commission's jury-rigged response hardly comports with
the perceived problems.20 A better approach would be for the Com-
mission to accommodate state desires for participation in those mat-
ters in which the balance of political needs favors coordinated action.
A refusal to coordinate would be appropriate only if the prospect of
interstate rivalry would prevent successful accommodation. 2'
To investigate these conclusions, this Article is divided into several
13. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(b)(1), 824a (1988). The Commission's authority to order
interconnection is highly circumscribed. Id. § 824i. See infra note 30 and accompanying
text.
14. Interstate compacts are authorized when approved by Congress. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning
Council is an example of a compact agency. See supra note 10.
15. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. The provision of joint federal-
state proceedings is apparent in other federal statutes. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C § 410 (1988)
(joint proceedings under the Federal Communications Act of 1934). Section 410 was
modeled on a similar provision contained in the Interstate Commerce Act. H.R. REP. No.
1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934). See TYLER BERRY, COMMUNICATIONS BY WIRE AND
RADIO 244-46 (1937).
17. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
18. Id.
19. See infra notes 104-18 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
parts. As Part I suggests, the Federal Power Act authorizes the use
of joint boards to solve federal-state coordination problems. Part II
demonstrates that the Commission has devised numerous suspect
reasons for avoiding the use of joint boards, hearings, or conferences.
Part III critiques the rationales offered by the Commission in light
of traditional and representational models of agency decision mak-
ing. In both regards, the Commission's decisions are found wanting.
Parts IV and V discuss a more legitimate concern about the politics
associated with regional decision making and offer a proposal for ad-
dressing those concerns.
II. THE JOINT BOARD IN THE FEDERAL LEGAL STRUCTURE
A. The Need for Federal Regulation
Title II of the Federal Power Act primarily concerns the regula-
tion of interstate transmission and transfers of power by wholesale.22
The 1935 amendments creating Title II responded to the gap in reg-
ulation caused by the Supreme Court's Attleboro decision.23 In that
1927 case, the Rhode Island commission sought to set wholesale
rates of electricity sold by a Rhode Island generating company to a
Massachusetts distribution company.24 The Court concluded that the
transaction was in interstate commerce even though title to the elec-
tricity transferred at the state line.25 This determination precluded
state regulation. Thus, "if such regulation [was] required it [could]
only be attained by the exercise of power vested in Congress. 26
At the same time that the states lost their regulatory authority,
the perceived need for regulation of interstate sales increased. The
committee reports for both the Senate and the House noted an in-
crease in interstate sales from 10.7% in 1928 to 17.8% in 1933.27
Additionally, Congress' decision to enact the Public Utilities Holding
Company Act (the Act) 28 did not check the potential for unregu-
lated transactions. Reacting to the perceived ills created by the na-
tional holding companies, Congress required that the companies
divest into smaller, regionally and economically related entities.20
22. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824k (1988).
23. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
24. Public Util. Comm'n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 84
(1927).
25. Id. at 86.
26. Id.
27. S. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 1318, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935).
28. The Public Utilities Holding Company Act was Title I of the Public Utility
Act of 1935.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b) (1988).
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The companies required to be divested by the Act could sell in inter-
state commerce. Likewise, the remaining holding companies would
be regional entities whose transactions were in interstate commerce.
Each was outside state regulation after the Attleboro decision.
B. Title II Regulation
To regulate this growing interstate market, Title II of the Federal
Power Act was a compromise based on strong notions of federal-
state cooperation. First, the provisions created a federal structure to
regulate interstate transmission and sales for resale of electricity.
Second, they provided a forum to encourage voluntary regionaliza-
tion of the electric grid.30 These potentially conflicting goals natu-
rally lead to confusion as to the jurisdictional limits of state and
federal authority. The Act resolved the federal-state tension in part
by providing for state involvement in federal decision making.
First, Title II filled the regulatory gap, but assumed bifurcated
regulatory authority. Subsection 201(a) of the Federal Power Act
provides that "[f]ederal regulation . . . extend[s] only to those mat-
ters which are not subject to regulation by the States." 3' Subsection
201(b)(1) states much the same thing: "The provisions of this sub-
chapter shall apply to the transmission of electric energy in inter-
state commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in
interstate commerce, but . . . shall not apply to any other sale of
electrical energy or deprive a State or State commission of its lawful
authority now exercised over the exportation of hydroelectric energy
which is transmitted across a State line."132 Thus, the operative lan-
guage of the statute separated state and federal jurisdiction, leaving
to the states the obligation to set local or retail rates.
The legislative history of the Federal Power Act reinforced the
congressional goal to continue local control of retail rates. The Sen-
ate Report, for example, stated that the purpose of the Act was to
regulate the increasingly large and important interstate market that
the states could not regulate constitutionally."3 The House agreed
30. In the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act, Congress gave the Commission
limited authority to order wheeling in 1978. See Megan A. Wallace, A Negotiated Alter-
native to Mandatory wheeling, 10 ENERGY L.J. 99, 100-03 (1989). That power was en-
hanced by amendments in 1992. See National Energy Policy Act, Pub. L. 102-486, §§
721-22, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
31. Federal Power Act § 201(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1988).
32. Federal Power Act § 201(b)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (1988).
33. S. REP. No. 621, supra note 27, at 17.
and reinforced this message.34 The section-by-section analysis of the
House committee report stated, "As in the Senate bill no jurisdiction
is given over local distribution of electric energy, and the authority
of States to fix local rates is not disturbed even in those cases where
the energy is brought in from another State."35
The bifurcated structure complicates the second goal of the act,
the encouragement of interconnection. Section 202 authorizes the
Commission to coordinate (but not mandate) interstate sales and
transmission.36 The Senate Report gave an interesting policy justifi-
cation for structuring the provision this way:
Under this subsection the Commission would have authority to work out
the ideal utility map of the country and supervise the development of the
industry toward that ideal. The committee is confident that enlightened
self-interest will lead the utilities to cooperate with the commission and
with each other in bringing about the economies which can alone be secured
through the planned coordination which has long been advocated by the
most able and progressive thinkers on this subject."'
After a statement of legislative purpose consistent with the Senate
Report's policy statement, the section directed the Commission "to
divide the country into regional districts for the voluntary intercon-
nection and coordination of facilities for the generation, transmis-
sion, and sale of electric energy."38
Once interconnected, utilities are subject to numerous provisions
for the calculation and implementation of rates that the Commission
controls. The primary provisions concern the determination of rates.
Section 205 provides that rates must be just and reasonable, that
there be no undue preferences, and that rates be filed before they
34. H.R. REP. No. 1318, supra note 27, at 8, states:
[T]he Commission is given no jurisdiction over local rates even where the elec-
tric energy moves in interstate commerce.. . . The bill takes no authority from
State commissions .... The new parts are so drawn as to be a complement to
and in no sense a usurpation of State regulatory authority and contain through-
out directions to the Federal Power Commission to receive and consider the
views of State commissions. Probably, no bill in recent years has so recognized
the responsibilities of State regulatory commissions as does Title II of this bill.
35. Id. at 27; S. REP. No. 621, supra note 27, at 48.
36. Federal Power Act § 202, 16 U.S.C. § 824a (1988).
37. S. REP. No. 621, supra note 27, at 49.
38. Federal Power Act § 202(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (1988). The section
continues:
It shall be the duty of the Commission to promote and encourage such inter-
connection and coordination within each such district and between such dis-
tricts. Before establishing any such district and fixing or modifying the
boundaries thereof the Commission shall give notice to the State commission of
each State situated wholly or in part within such district, and shall afford each
such State commission reasonable opportunity to present its views and recom-
mendations, and shall receive and consider such views and recommendations.
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may be charged to customers.3 9 Section 206 then provides a mecha-
nism for adjusting rates determined to be unjust or discriminatory.40
Despite the significant federal powers created by the Act, Con-
gress repeatedly required federal-state coordination. First, the states
were given an advisory role in the process of setting the regions for
interconnection. The legislative history again was clear: "In this sub-
section, as elsewhere throughout the title, the Commission is directed
to secure and consider the views and recommendations of State com-
missions before establishing regional districts."41 Second, Congress
directed the Commission to provide assistance to the states for their
determination of rates subject to state jurisdiction.42 As the Senate
Report explained, the section was included to assist the states in
making rate determinations in cases in which the property may be in
several states.43 Thus, Congress intended to coordinate effective state
rate making with federal assistance.
The most dramatic concession to the states was the provision for
joint proceedings. The Act recognized three forms of cooperation. In
subsection 209(a), the Commission could delegate its authority to
one or more states that are or might be affected by any matter."
39. Federal Power Act § 205, 16 U.S.C § 824d (1988).
40. Federal Power Act § 206, 16 U.S.C. § 824e (1988).
41. H.R. REP. No. 1318, supra note 27, at 27. See also S. REP. No. 621, supra
note 27, at 49.
42. Federal Power Act § 206(d), 16 U.S.C. § 824e(d) (1988), provides:
The Commission upon its own motion, or upon the request of any State com-
mission whenever it can do so without prejudice to the efficient and proper
conduct of its affairs, may investigate and determine the cost of the production
or transmission of electric energy by means of facilities under the jurisdiction
of the Commission in cases where the Commission has no authority to establish
a rate governing the sale of such energy.
43. S. REP. No. 621, supra note 27, at 51, states:
Since the rate-making powers granted to the Commission apply only to the
wholesale rates of energy sold in interstate commerce, this last subsection
should be of great benefit in removing the practical difficulty which the States
may encounter in regulating the interstate distribution rates which are left
under their control. Such rate regulation involves the examination and valua-
tion of property outside the State. The task is one requiring an agency with a
jurisdiction broader than that of a single State. The authority of the Federal
Commission is to render assistance to the State commissions in a way which
would preserve and make more effective the jurisdiction which is thus left to
the States.
44. Federal Power Act § 209(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824h(a) (1988), provides:
The Commission may refer any matter arising in the administration of this
subchapter to a board to be composed of a member or members, as determined
by the Commission, from the State or each of the States affected or to be
affected by such matter. Any such board shall be vested with the same power
and be subject to the same duties and liabilities as in the case of a member of
Under this provision, the board would operate as though it were the
federal authority. The alternative forms for federal-state cooperation
were joint conferences or hearings. Under subsection 209(b), the
Commission could confer with the affected states or "hold joint hear-
ings with any State commission in connection with any matter with
respect to which the Commission is authorized to act." 45
The legislative history again provided an explanation for these
provisions. In the case of subsection 209(a), the Senate Report
stated, "This subsection is designed to permit decentralized adminis-
tration under the general supervision of the Commission by individu-
als who are acquainted with the situation and the problems of the
locality affected by the particular proceeding." '46 Likewise, Congress
directed in subsection (b) that the Commission avail itself of the co-
operation offered by the states.47
Joint proceedings thus present a means of coordinating federal
and state action since they place the parties in direct authoritative
relationships with one another. Under a delegation of authority, the
state board would act as an agent of the Commission. 4" Alterna-
tively, joint hearings would provide a forum for coordinated receipt
of evidence and the opportunity for coordinated decision making.40
the Commission when designated by the Commission to hold any hearings. The
action of such board shall have such force and effect and its proceedings shall
be conducted in such manner as the Commission shall by regulations prescribe.
The board shall be appointed by the Commission from persons nominated by
the State commission of each State affected or by the Governor of such State if
there is no State commission. Each State affected shall be entitled to the same
number of representatives on the board unless the nominating power of such
State waives such right. The Commission shall have discretion to reject the
nominee from any State, but shall thereupon invite a new nomination from that
State. The members of a board shall receive such allowances for expenses as
the Commission shall provide. The Commission may, when in its discretion
sufficient reason exists therefor, revoke any reference to such a board.
45. Federal Power Act § 209(b), 16 U.S.C. § 824h(b) (1988). The full section
provides:
The Commission may confer with any State commission regarding the relation-
ship between rate structures, costs, accounts, charges, practices, classifications,
and regulations of public utilities subject to the jurisdiction of such State com-
mission and of the Commission; and the Commission is authorized, under such
rules and regulations as it shall prescribe, to hold joint hearings with any State
commission in connection with any matter with respect to which the Commis-
sion is authorized to act. The Commission is authorized in the administration
of this chapter to avail itself of such cooperation, services, records, and facili-
ties as may be afforded by any State commission.
Id.
46. S. REP. No. 621, supra note 27, at 52.
47. H.R. REP. No. 1318, supra note 27, at 30.
48. The Commission may terminate the delegation as a matter within its own dis-
cretion. Federal Power Act § 209(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824h(a) (1988) (last sentence).
49. The possibility of parties telling different stories to different regulators obvi-
ously would be impossible under this scenario.
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C. Commission Rules and Practice
Despite the apparent benefits each approach suggests and the
clear legislative encouragement for federal-state coordination, the
Commission and its predecessor, the Federal Power Commission,
adopted rules and practices that make the use of these devices im-
possible. First, the rules provide significant qualifications on the use
of the joint proceedings. Second, the Commission has refused to use
federal-state cooperation on the many occasions on which states have
requested it. As a result, the use of authoritative joint boards5" is
nonexistent.
1. Commission Rules
The Commission has several rules defining its intended coopera-
tion with the state commissions. 1 In rule 1301, the Commission
recognizes the three statutory forms of joint activity: reference to the
states, conferences, and joint hearings. The subject matter for these
activities could be quite extensive. According to the rule, "It is un-
derstood .. . that the Commission or any State commission will
freely suggest cooperation with respect to any proceeding or matter
affecting any public utility or natural gas company subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission and of a State commission, and con-
cerning which it is believed that cooperation will be in the public
interest.'53 With this broad purpose stated, the rules then set out
some straightforward notice requirements to initiate a joint
proceeding.4
From these statements, apparently consistent with the legislation,
the rules take a quick turn to stating that authoritative uses are lim-
ited. Various sections provide the Commission's preference for infor-
mal conferences55 and intervention. 6 In a policy statement within
50. The term "authoritative" to qualify this statement is used because the Com-
mission prefers advisory boards and conferences. See infra notes 55-56 and accompany-
ing text.
51. The rules concerning cooperation with the states were adopted without sub-
stantive change from the prior rules of the Commission. FERC Order No. 225, [1981-
1982 Transfer Binder] Util. L. Rep. (CCH) 5944 (Apr. 28, 1982).
52. 18 C.F.R. § 385.1301 (1991).
53. 18 C.F.R. § 385.1301(b) (1991).
54. 18 C.F.R. § 385.1302 (1991).
55. 18 C.F.R. § 385.1303 (1991).
56. In rule 1306, the Commission reminds the states of their right to intervene in
Commission proceedings. 18 C.F.R. § 385.1306 (1991). Second, a state may not serve
on a joint board and act as an intervenor to a proceeding even though the apparent
jurisdiction of the agencies is separate. 18 C.F.R. § 385.1305(g) (1991). See Kansas Gas
the rules, the Commission further opines that its experience with in-
formal conferences suggested the benefits of such an approach. 7
Then, the Commission in rule 1304 states that joint state boards are
extraordinary proceedings. According to the Commission, "It is be-
lieved that the statutory provisions ...of the Federal Power and
Natural Gas Acts, for the reference of a proceeding to a board con-
stituted as therein provided, were designed for use in unusual cases,
and as a means of relief to the Commission when it might find itself
unable to hear and determine cases before it, in the usual course,
without undue delay."58 The Commission also retains complete con-
trol of the proceedings, their subject matter, and their legal effect. 9
Finally, rule 1305 provides for joint hearings in which the commis-
sions might sit to hear the cases concurrently. Each commission in
the concurrent hearing, however, retains jurisdiction over the matters
individually or in an advisory capacity. 60 Procedurally, each commis-
sion retains complete control of its proceeding and the evidence that
it will consider in reaching a decision.6 1 In one concession to coordi-
nation, the Commission affords commissions the opportunity to con-
fer before issuing any orders.62 Despite this last suggestion of comity
between state and federal regulators, the Commission rules appear to
be skewed against formal joint proceedings.
2. Commission Practice
Despite the apparent bias against the use of cooperative proce-
dures, many political actors have suggested joint proceedings. Courts
have promoted their use to deal with antitrust problems resulting
from competing state and federal pricing schemes.6 3 Likewise, indi-
vidual commissioners (and Federal Power commissioners) 4 and ad-
ministrative law judges6 5 have suggested the use of joint boards.
Most of the requests come from the states on a variety of significant
& Elec. Co., 31 F.E.R.C. I 61,379, 61,846 (1985); Attorney General of Mass. v. New
England Power Co., 27 F.E.R.C. % 61029, 61051 (1984).
57. 18 C.F.R. § 385.1303 (1991).
58. 18 C.F.R. § 385.1304(a) (1991).
59. 18 C.F.R. § 385.1304(b) (1991).
60. 18 C.F.R. § 385.1305(a),(b) (1991).
61. 18 C.F.R. § 385.1305(d)(2) (1991). Likewise, records of the hearing are dis-
tinct. 18 C.F.R. § 385.1305(d)(4) (1991).
62. 18 C.F.R. § 385.1305(e) (1991).
63. City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 992 (7th Cir.
1980). See the related discussion of the court of appeals in Conway Corp. v. FPC, 510
F.2d 1264, 1272-73 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affd, 426 U.S. 271 (1976).
64. Notice of Pub. Conference and Request for Comments on Elec. Issues, 55
F.E.R.C. % 61,069, 61,200 (1991) (Trabandt, Comm'r, concurring); American Elec.
Power Serv. Corp., 8 F.E.R.C. f 61,068 (1979) (Holden, Comm'r, concurring).
65. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 11 F.E.R.C. % 63,028, 65,196 (1980) (Benkin,
Administrative Law Judge).
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and unusual matters. 6 In practice, however, the Commission has
taken an even narrower view of the role of the states in regional
matters than that suggested by the rules.6
7
A survey of the cases indicates four rationales for not initiating
joint board procedures. First, the Commission has stated that juris-
dictional requirements prevent its approval. Second, the Commission
has stated that cases were not unusual enough to justify appointment
of a joint board. Third, the Commission has argued that its denial is
an appropriate use of its administrative discretion. Finally, it has de-
nied requests based on procedural errors by the applicants. Judged
by the usual legal arguments of statutory interpretation and consis-
tency with legislative purpose, the reasons offered by the Commis-
sion to deny the requests appear questionable.
a. Jurisdictional Barriers
The claim that the jurisdictional provisions prevent joint boards is
one of the more common rationales for a denial. The Commission's
basic position is that it has sole jurisdiction over a matter under ei-
ther the Federal Power Act or an identical provision in the Natural
Gas Act, 8 and this authority precludes state involvement. In a pair
of 1974 decisions,69 for example, a state commission asked for a
thorough review of Eastern Utilities Associates, a multistate holding
company. The Commission noted that the applications concerned
rates for wholesales from the generating utility, a matter solely
within federal authority, and concluded, "The joint board procedure
could in no way alter the existing federal-state jurisdictional sta-
tus. '" 70 The Commission has used the same argument to deny state
66. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 49 F.E.R.C. 61,134 (1989) (authorization for
pipeline construction); Kansas Gas and Elec. Co., 31 F.E.R.C. 11 61,379 (1985) (account-
ing treatment of nuclear plant construction costs); Stowers Oil and Gas Co. et al., 33
F.E.R.C. 61,207 (1985) (violations of gas pricing rules); Attorney General of Mass. v.
New England Power Co., 27 F.E.R.C. 61,029 (1984) (treatment of plant outage costs);
Kansas State Corp. Comm'n, 25 F.E.R.C. 61,400 (1983) (take-or-pay contract
problems); Northern States Power Co., 10 F.E.R.C. T 61,167 (1980) (treatment of plant
cancellation costs); Gas Curtailments and Allocations, 54 F.P.C. 1240, reh'g denied, 54
F.P.C. 2170 (1975) (gas curtailment plans).
67. There were three orders setting joint hearings prior to World War II. Memphis
Natural Gas Co., 2 F.P.C. 917 (1941); Western Natural Gas Co., 2 F.P.C. 802 (1940);
Independent Natural Gas Co., 2 F.P.C. 803 (1940). In each case, a joint hearing was
approved as an alternative to a joint board.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 717p (1988).
69. New England Power Co., 52 F.P.C. 855 (1974); Montaup Elec. Co., 52 F.P.C.
853 (1974).
70. New England Power Co., 52 F.P.C. at 856; Montaup, 52 F.P.C. at 854.
requests for joint boards to investigate gas curtailment plans,7 1 con-
struction of portions of interstate pipelines, 2 and the allocation of
costs due to plant outages by wholesalers. 3
The jurisdictional rationale suffers from some obvious flaws. First,
the statute authorizing joint boards permits the Commission to dele-
gate its authority over a matter to the states. The regulations con-
template the same result. Clearly, therefore, the Commission has the
authority to allow the states to consider a matter. Alternatively, the
creation of joint conferences or hearings do not contemplate the
transfer of any federal authority to the states. Thus, in the latter two
instances, there is no jurisdictional issue raised. In short, the asser-
tion that there is a jurisdictional barrier to state participation is ei-
ther wrong or irrelevant.
b. The "Unusual Case" Rationale
The second frequently cited rationale for denying the use of a joint
proceeding is that the case is not "unusual" enough to justify the
special procedure. Relying on what is now rule 1304, the Commis-
sion in a 1975 gas curtailment case concluded that use of a joint
board was intended for unusual cases that the Commission could not
hear and determine in the usual course.74 Thus, the Commission con-
fined the use of the board to situations in which it could not make
timely resolution of a case and left the states to their right to
intervene.
This interpretive spin is not supported by the statute or the legisla-
tive history.15 Rather, a more consistent reading of the statute and
the congressional reports suggests a congressional desire to keep the
process open to the states and to involve them when their interests
were at stake. Importantly, more was intended than intervention
alone. Had that been the goal, the provision for joint boards is ab-
surd. Likewise, more than service as a spill tank for federal overload
must have been intended; such a limited approach would have been
stated in the legislation. Instead, the scope of the subject matter both
in section 209 and the rules encompasses any matter concerning a
71. Gas Curtailments and Allocations, 54 F.P.C. 1240, 1242, reh'g denied, 54
F.P.C. 2170, 2171 (1975).
72. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 49 F.E.R.C. 1 61,134 (1989).
73. Attorney General of Mass. v. New England Power Co., 27 F.E.R.C. 1 61,029,
61,051 (1984).
74. Investigation of Revised Curtailment Level on the System of Tennessee Gas
Pipeline Co., 53 F.P.C. 657, 658-59 (1975). See also Kansas Gas and Elec. Co., 31
F.E.R.C. 61,379, 61,845 (1985) (the procedure is intended "as a means of relief to the
Commission when it might find itself unable to hear and determine cases before it, in the
usual course, without undue delay.")
75. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 30: 485. 1993] A Critical Analysis of Joint Board Policy
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
regulated utility.76
This rationale is especially suspect in what might be considered
the ultimate unusual matter. In Kansas State Corporation Commis-
sion,77 the state commission asked for the creation of a joint body to
investigate the problems associated with take-or-pay contracts. a The
Commission rejected the request on the ground that the case was not
sufficiently unique and could be handled in pending rate cases. 9 Any
familiarity with the area, however, suggests that this was not a mat-
ter that could be handled in the usual course. Since 1985, the Com-
mission has issued two rule makings 0 and suffered repeated defeats
in the court of appeals."' Indeed, the complaint from the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia is that the Commission has
failed to address the take-or-pay problems in a coherent manner.8 2
Given the complex issues and the delay in resolution, take-or-pay
litigation has been an unusual case in any normal sense of the term.
To suggest otherwise simply ignores the obvious.
c. An Exercise of Board Discretion
Although the Commission has sought to justify its decisions within
the previous two reasons, several cases also resort to the argument of
administrative discretion or convenience. In Stowers Oil and Gas
Co., for example, the Commission noted that the statute provided
the Commission with the discretion to authorize a hearing, but it
declined to exercise its discretion because of the "immediate need to
correct the ongoing violations .... -83 Likewise, the Commission
noted the unwieldiness of a joint board to prosecute a hearing on
76. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
77. Kansas State Corp. Comm'n, 25 F.E.R.C. % 61,400 (1983).
78. In a take-or-pay contract, a buyer is required to pay for a base amount of the
product without regard to delivery. During the natural gas shortages, many gas pipelines
contracted under multiyear take-or-pay contracts to purchase gas. The contracts, how-
ever, became very expensive when gas gluts and low sales resulted in reduced revenues.
One pipeline, Columbia Transmission, has filed for bankruptcy protection as a result of
take-or-pay contracts. Suein L. Hwang, Columbia Gas and its Pipeline Unit File for
Chapter 11 after Credit Talks Fail, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1991, at A3.
79. Kansas State Corp. Comm'n, 25 F.E.R.C. at 61,905 (1983).
80. Order No. 436, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (1985); Order No. 500, 52 Fed. Reg.
30,334 (1987).
81. American Gas Ass'n v. FERC, 912 F.2d 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied
sub nom., City of Willcox, Arizona v. FERC, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991); Associated Gas
Distrib. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom., Interstate Nat-
ural Gas Ass'n v. FERC, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
82. Id.
83. Stowers Oil and Gas Co., 33 F.E.R.C. 1 61,207, 61422 (1985).
curtailment84 and concluded that the process would be "probably in-
effectual." '85 The Commission has also suggested that the use of joint
proceedings would create confusion and duplication.86
On thq surface, these rationales are a little more difficult to pene-
trate. The Commission is correct in saying the statute gives it the
discretion to choose the form of the hearing and the level of state
participation. This rationale, however, begins to suffer when the
Commission asserts the specific problems that it thinks will occur.
First, none of the concerns about process is unique to a joint board
proceeding. A proceeding that affects all the states, such as curtail-
ment, will be unwieldy no matter who is directing the review. Confu-
sion, on the other hand, may be even greater without joint
proceedings since the alternative is multiple state proceedings on the
related state matters with further attempts to integrate the federal
and state decisions.
Second, the complaint concerning ineffectual results is also suspect
since the process has not been attempted in any regular way. Be-
cause extensive experience with the joint boards is lacking, the Com-
mission's assertion that cooperation will be ineffective is a guess at
best. What makes the Commission's policy all the more disconcert-
ing is its use of the mandated boards under the Pacific Northwest
Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act. 87 This Act is a con-
gressionally-approved compact of several northwestern states for the
regional development and distribution of power from public and pri-
vate utilities.88 Under the Act, the Commission approves rates sug-
gested to it by the Bonneville Power Administration, the public
power authority in the Northwest. 9 Congress, however, required the
creation of joint boards as authorized by the Federal Power Act to
"assist the Commission in its review of such rates."90 Under this leg-
islative direction, the Commission established a joint board of the
84. Gas Curtailments and Allocations, 54 F.P.C. 2170, 2171 (1975) (denial of re-
quest for rehearing).
85. Investigation of Revised Curtailment Level on the system of Tennessee Gas
Pipeline Co., 53 F.P.C. 657, 659 (1975). See also Gas Curtailments and Allocations, 54
F.P.C. 1240, 1242 (1975) (initial decision) (motion for states to sit in an advisory role
rejected as "unwieldy, procedurally inefficient and therefore, inexpedient. .. ").
86. New England Elec. Power Co., 52 F.P.C. 855, 856 (1974); Montaup Elec. Co.,
52 F.P.C. 853, 854 (1974).
87. Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h
(1988)). These comments are not a suggestion that the Commission has implemeted the
congressional directive in its application of the joint hearing requirement to the extent
that it might. It has not. The Commission has circumsribed the issues and reduced the
joint board's role to an advisory one used at the convenience of the Commission. JONES
ET AL., supra note 5 (manuscript at 144-51).
88. H.R. REP. No. 976 (Part I), 96 Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5989, 5982.
89. 16 U.S.C. §§ 839e(a)(2), 839e(i)(6) (1988).
90. 16 U.S.C. § 839f(g) (1988) provides:
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affected states with a federal administrative law judge as the presid-
ing officer.91 The Commission has placed the board in an essentially
advisory role to provide comments concerning rate proposals submit-
ted to the Commission for approval. 92 In practice, the board's role
appears to be flexible;93 and the Commission, in its order creating
the board, has limited the delays that might result from the creation
of an additional layer of review. 94
Two important points are evident in the creation of this joint
board. First, the Commission can adopt a flexible procedure. In par-
ticular, the Commission need not cede its authority in the process of
providing the states a mandated voice. Second, the process need not
be cumbersome. The Commission can structure the proceedings in
such a way as to avoid delay while providing for higher levels of
state participation. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that the Commis-
sion's routine dismissals of joint board and hearing requests are justi-
fied by administrative discretion.
d. Procedural Errors
Finally, the Commission has denied requests for joint proceedings
on the basis of procedural flaws in the applications. In Texas Gas
Transmission Corporation,95 the Commission found that the request
failed to raise an issue of fact justifying appointment of a joint
board. In Montaup Electric Co. and New England Power Co.,96 the
Commission concluded that the applicant failed to state the issues
for review and desired relief with sufficient specificity.
Neither of the procedural questions proves fatal to state involve-
ment. The first rationale concerning the lack of factual issues simply
When reviewing rates for the sale of power to the Administrator by an inves-
tor-owned utility customer under section 839c(c) or 839d of this title, the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission shall, in accordance with section 824h of
this title-
(1) convene a joint State board, and
(2) invest such board with such duties and authority as will assist the Com-
mission in its review of such rates.
91. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 17 F.E.R.C.
1 61,005 (1981).
92. Id. 1 61,011.
93. See, e.g., Puget Sound Power and Light Co., 26 F.E.R.C. % 61,172 (1984).
94. Pacific Power and Light Co., 28 F.E.R.C. 61,143, 61,258, 61,260 n.16
(1984) (the board reviews the initial decision of the administrative law judge and must
make its recommendations within ninety days of receipt of the initial decision).
95. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 49 F.E.R.C. 61,134 (1989).
96. Montaup Elec. Co., 52 F.P.C. 853, 854 (1974); New England Power Co., 52
F.P.C. 855, 856 (1974).
does not make sense. Whether the role of the board is advisory or
adjudicative, the board members review facts, disputed or otherwise,
and apply the law. The state can serve in that function even if there
is no factual issue presented by the pleadings. The second issue is
also insignificant and can be remedied by better pleading or amend-
ments to a defective pleading. Thus, these concerns need not be con-
trolling if they are not a screen to hide the Commission's distaste for
sharing its authority.
3. Informal Conferences
In its rules, the Commission suggests that it favors the use of in-
formal conferences as a cooperative device.97 At least in theory, the
use of informal conferences would be consistent with lower levels of
regional cooperation. On the other hand, the practice obviously
would not have the same import as a joint hearing or a referral to
the states. Thus, some question exists about the efficacy of the ap-
proach even at this level.
In practice, moreover, the Commission does not appear to use the
informal conference as a device to involve the states in the regional
decision-making process. While there are literally hundreds of cases
in which the Commission has ordered or considered the use of an
informal conference, 98 a review of the decisions from January 1986
to April 1992 did not reveal any case in which the Commission used
an informal conference as a method of regional cooperation.,
Rather, the Commission normally uses the informal conference as a
form, of alternative dispute resolution. Cases concern the use of con-
ferences to identify issues in filings, 100 to identify issues for hear-
ing, 0 as a settlement device, 02 or to assist in discovery.10 3
97. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
98. A Lexis search using the term "informal conference" located 460 commission
decisions which discussed the term. Search of LEXIS, Energy library, FERC file (Apr.,
1991).
99. Approximately 140 cases identified in the search noted in the prior note were
reviewed. Search of LEXIS, Energy library, FERC file (Apr., 1991). A second search
using the statement contained in the Rule 1303 suggesting the Commission's preference
for informal conferences did not locate a single case. Search of LEXIS, Energy library,
FERC file (Apr., 1991).
100. Paiute Pipeline Co., 55 F.E.R.C. % 61,462 (1991); Transcontinental Gas Pipe
Line Corp., 53 F.E.R.C. % 63,006 (1990); City of Seattle, Wash., 48 F.E.R.C. 1 61,333(1989); Southern Natural Gas Co., 45 F.E.R.C. T 61,218 (1988); Northern Natural Gas
Co., 37 F.E.R.C. 1 61,343 (1986).
101. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 50 F.E.R.C. % 61,395 (1990); Panhandle E. Pipe
Line Co., 48 F.E.R.C. 63,021 (1989); Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 40 F.E.R.C. 1 61,068(1987); ARCO Pipe Line Co., 36 F.E.R.C. % 62,212 (1986); Northwest Pipeline Co., 35
F.E.R.C. 61,049 (1986); ANR Pipeline Co., 34 F.E.R.C. 1 61,114 (1986); Columbia
Gas Transmission Co., 34 F.E.R.C. 1 61,002 (1986).
102. ANR Pipeline Co., 47 F.E.R.C. % 61,113 (1989); Panhandle E. Pipe Line
Co., 46 F.E.R.C. T 61,183 (1989); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 45 F.E.R.C. 61,523
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D. Summary
In summary, the Commission's repeated refusals to initiate a joint
board or hearing are problematic. The jurisdictional claim is plainly
wrong. The limitation to unusual cases appears at odds with the leg-
islative intent. The rationales used to justify the exercises of adminis-
trative discretion are illogical or at best untested. The Commission's
own successful performance with the Northwest Pacific Power Coun-
cil suggests that the procedure can work effectively. The informal
conference does not appear to operate as a mechanism for regional
issues or federal-state cooperation. Once again, the Commission's ba-
sic disposition against cooperative.regulation is reinforced.
III. MODELS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMISSION'S
JOINT BOARD POLICY
Apart from the essentially interpretive criticisms of the Commis-
sion's policy so far advanced, it may also be criticized for its failure
to comport with a rational model of administrative law. Inherent in
administrative law is a tension between the technical requirements of
reasoned decision making and the political demands within a democ-
racy for participation and expression of popular will in the outcomes
of that process. 0 4 Two models of administrative law are often ad-
vanced to deal with that tension. 10 5 One, the traditional-incremental
model, places a high premium on narrowly defined decisions within a
(1988); Great Lakes Transmission Co., 45 F.E.R.C. 1 61,017 (1988); Equitable Gas Co.,
42 F.E.R.C. 1 61,023 (1988); Great Lakes Transmission Co., 41 F.E.R.C. 61,094
(1988); Algonquin Gas Transmission Co., 35 F.E.R.C. % 61,273 (1986).
103. Trunkline Gas Co., 40 F.E.R.C. 1 61,203-(1987)..
104. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1-3 (1974). In a recent book, Christopher Edley divides the
issue into expertise, fairness, and politics. CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY passim (1990).
105. The models advanced here are drawn from the work of Richard B. Stewart,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975). Nu-
merous models of administrative law may be advanced that offer both descriptive and
normative views, or some combination thereof. Colin Diver, for example, offers a compar-
ative approach that stresses the technical versus the political nature of the process that
echoes the work of Stewart. Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative
Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1981). Robert Reich also sees that dichotomy but finds a
prescriptive need for a model based on public deliberation. Robert Reich, Public Admin-
istration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617 (1985). The
tension between the technical requirements of reasoned decision making and the political
requirements of democracy also finds its way into the literature concerning regional regu-
lation. For a detailed study of the matter, see ACKERMAN ET AL., supra note 104; MAR-
IAN E. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A QUESTION OF FEDERALISM (1971).
tightly constrained regulatory framework. A second, the representa-
tional model, emphasizes high levels of participation and political ac-
commodation. While the traditional model might initially be argued
to support the result of the Commission's policy, it is inconsistent
with the broad representational and decisional intent suggested by
the operative statutes and legislative history. On the other hand, the
representational model comports with the legislative structure and
history, but not with the Commission's rules and practice. In sub-
stance, then, the Commission's policy stands as neither fish nor fowl.
A. Traditional-Incremental and Representational Models
The traditional-incremental model resolves the tension between
administrative discretion and political demands by defining the task
of the agency within narrow statutory guides. Three principles are
important. First, the action of the agency is benchmarked against its
statutory authority, and actions outside that authority are not per-
missible.'06 Second, the agency's procedures must be designed to as-
sure that the agency complies with its substantive mandate. In this
regard, basic due process rights assure that the agency does not in-
teffere with personal or property rights unless supported by substan-
tial evidence determined by an impartial fact finder, after a hearing,
and based on a record.0 7 Finally, the process must afford an oppor-
tunity for judicial review as a final check on administrative discre-
tion. 08 Under this constrained model, the agency operates "as a
mere transmission belt for implementing legislative directives in par-
ticular cases."' 109
In contrast, two important principles ground the representational
model. First, the agency serves as a forum for affected parties to
advance their views. Thus, the model assumes broad rights to initiate
and intervene, to participate in hearings, and to appeal based on
minimal standing requirements."10 Second, it assumes that the
agency will consider and accommodate multiple views in its decision-
making process."' As Richard Stewart summarizes the model,
"[T]he problem of administrative procedure is to provide representa-
tion for all affected interests; the problem of substantive policy is to
reach equitable accommodations. . .; and the problem of judicial re-
view is to ensure that agencies provide fair procedures for represen-
tation and reach fair accommodations.""52
106. Stewart, supra note 105, at 1672-73.
107. Id. at 1673-74.
108. Id. at 1674-76.
109. Id. at 1675 (footnote omitted).
110. Id. at 1723-56.
111. Id. at 1756-60.
112. Id. at 1759.
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B. Application of the Models
On one level, the traditional-incremental model does not apply to
Title II of the Federal Power Act. The traditional view would place
decision making in the hands of the impartial federal arbiter who
would apply narrowly tailored statutes. In contrast, the substantive
provisions for determining reasonable rates are hardly an example of
congressional constraint on agency decision making. 113 Moreover, the
procedural requirements for state involvement suggest an essentially
political resolution for setting the agency's scope of authority. Sev-
eral of the provisions direct broad participation. The Commission is
to consult with the states and provide an opportunity for state in-
volvement either by intervention or direct participation. The latter
element of direct participation is especially telling. The creation of
the joint boards moves the decision-making process from the federal
agency into the hands of the states and thus forces the decision down
to politically more sensitive arenas such as state executive agencies.
These are not examples of a transmission belt approach to
regulation.
Even if one assumed that the Federal Power Act carefully con-
strained the agency (and thus was based on the traditional model),
the agency has failed to abide with the dictates to create a politically
open process. In interpreting the Act's provisions concerning joint
boards, the Commission has adopted rules that extend the opportu-
nity for joint hearings only in unusual cases. Additionally, the Com-
mission has found several other reasons to deny applications for joint
proceedings that further restrain coordination. In taking this posi-
tion, the Commission has ignored its legislative mandate, and the
traditional theory then fails to justify the Commission's action.
It follows that if the policy is representational, the Commission's
policy fails to conform with that model as well. The process for ac-
commodation included state involvement. At several points, Congress
directed federal-state cooperation and authorized the Commission to
create state boards in the affected regions to make binding decisions.
The political aspect of the latter power is significant. If the issue
Congress sought to address was a fear of interstate rivalry, then the
allocation of authority to the states is not understandable. What the
Supreme Court took away with Attleboro, Congress gave back.11 4
113. See Richard J. Pierce, The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in
Administrative Law, 64 TEx. L. REV. 469, 478-79 (1985).
114. Public Util. Comm'n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83
(1927); see supra notes 5 and 23-24 and accompanying text.
On the other hand, if the states have a protected interest, then thejoint board provisions reflect the very premises of the representa-
tional model. Congress meant for the Commission to involve the
states in the decision-making process, and in some cases to have the
states that are affected make the decisions themselves.
IV. THE COMMISSION DECISIONS AS FAILED POLICY
The Commission's decisions are not explained by either of the
models discussed above. As a result, the decisions are susceptible to
criticism not only for their legal deficiencies," 5 but also in light of
the policy concerns that the models are intended to address. As
noted previously, each of the models attempts to correct for the po-
litical concerns inherent in agency decision making. The traditional-
incremental model attempts to do so by tight governance of the
agency's action.' 16 However, those checks fail if the agency exercises
its discretion in a way inconsistent with the apparent legislative in-
tent.1 1 7 Alternatively, the representational model corrects for the po-
litical failures by expanding the range of actors and incorporating a
policy of accommodation." 8 The Commission frustrates that policy,
however, when it fails to incorporate as decision makers the affected
parties Congress anticipated could and should make policy judg-
ments about regional matters.
The alternative offered to the states is intervention. At best, this
alternative dilutes the voice of the states. A state is one of many
interested parties including customers and competitors, all demand-
ing the attention of the Commission. It also reduces the accountabil-
ity for decision making by reserving it to federal decision makers.
Those closest to the parties to be affected by regional decisions are
the state governments. Yet, the political authority is reserved to fed-
eral commissioners with less apparent stake in the outcome.
A. An Alternative Basis for Justifying the Commission Policy
The political problem of the Commission's decisions, nonetheless,
is a two-edged sword. By regionalizing decision making through the
use of joint boards, hearings, or conferences, the state and federal
actors may introduce so much politics into the process as to defeat a
rational regional decision. A study of one regional agency that joined
federal and state officials for environmental planning offers an anti-
dote to an unqualified demand for greater political participation by
states in the decision-making process.
115. See supra notes 50-96 and accompanying text.
116. Stewart, supra note 105, at 1679-81.
117. Id. at 1682.
118. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
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An analysis of the Delaware River Basin Commission, an inter-
state compact with the Department of Interior as a voting member,
showed that the state and federal actors did not avoid taking what
were essentially parochial views based on their federal or state posi-
tions." 9 The Commission considered five options developed by a
team of federal experts. 120 Despite the extensive empirical work that
showed one clean-up proposal superior to the others, the state and
federal members voted to adopt a more expensive, but questionably
more effective, approach based on political factors.' 2 ' In doing so,
the actors looked for advice from their own advisors and ignored that
offered by the experts hired to present regional views. 22 In the end,
the institutional incentives to secure authority and the resulting po-
litical credit frustrated the attempt at regional decision making.123
It does not take overly sophisticated analysis to suggest that the
problems associated with the Delaware River Basin Commission also
could affect regional electric regulation. The recent experience with
the allocation of costs of completed nuclear plant construction raises
the specter of states attempting to shift costs to their neighbors. 124
When the stakes are so large and politically dangerous, one might
expect that state officials will protect their own political well-be-
ing. "'25 The Commission's decision then can be perceived as an appro-
priate barrier to the balkanization that might otherwise occur if the
states were authorized to plan and price the sale and transmission of
electricity within regions.
By itself that concern does not justify the Commission's actions. If
the Commission's policy is grounded in this political concern, then
the federal agency has taken a policy position that is not supported
by the legislation, its legislative history, or the political model that
accounts for both. Congress anticipated a representational model
119. ACKERMAN ET AL., supra note 104, at 165-207.
120. Id. at 14.
121. Id. at 193-200.
122. Id. at 168.
123. Id. at 188-89.
124. A clever example of this is the New Orleans City Council decision concerning
the costs of Grand Gulf I construction. After failing to secure the reduction it desired
from the Commission, the Council disallowed a portion of the costs on the basis that the
utility should have mitigated its expenses by selling a portion of its allocation to another
utility. In no small irony, the amount of the disallowance was equivalent to that sought
by the Council at the Commission. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New
Orleans, 911 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1617 (1991), and cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 411 (1991).
125. See Frank P. Darr, Book Review, 10 ENERGY L.J. 337 (1989) (reviewing
MILTON A. CHASE, ELECTRIC POWER: AN INDUSTRY AT A CROSSROADS (1988)).
with the states acting for their own regional interests. That policy is
usurped by the Commission's action. At the very least, the Commis-
sion could strike a better balance than the current policy of uniform
denial.
B. Implications of the Criticisms
Based on the representational model, the Commission's policy
should be modified in two respects. First, the Commission should
amend its rules to expand the conditions under which it will author-
ize the use of joint boards. The Commission should consider their
use in two situations. Initially, the boards would be appropriate in
those situations in which the Commission needs assistance because
its current work load is too large. There is nothing inconsistent with
the states' assistance, but it is hardly the sole reason as suggested by
the Commission's current interpretation. Additionally, the Commis-
sion should consider using a joint board or hearing in those circum-
stances that are associated with essentially planning activities, such
as those for interconnection.' 26 At this stage in the development, the
parties most directly affected could raise and decide issues of local
interest. As the process moves toward determination of the costs of
final construction, the Commission may well be best suited for the
decision. Past experience suggests that the political interests of the
states can be especially difficult to corral, and the representational
interests may well need to be diluted through a federal arbiter acting
alone.
Second, the Commission should discard the almost whimsical jus-
tifications for its current policy of denying requests for joint boards
or hearings. On one level, most arer logical nonsense and therefore
not worth retaining.'27 At another level, they distort the important
126. The scope of the Commission's jurisdictional authority presents something of
a problem here. Because the Commission lacks siting authority, there are some practical
limits to what it and the states might do under § 209. On the other hand, the Commis-
sion's authority has broadened apparently from recent Supreme Court decisions to in-
clude important powers to allocate costs of construction. See supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
The model offered by the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation
Act is particularly compelling at this stage of the process. The act provides for the states'
council to prepare a plan for the development of new facilities and alternatives. See
supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text. Unlike the Planning and Conservation Act,
the Federal Power Act does not require joint action. Additionally, there is a potential
conflict between 16 U.S.C. § 824b and § 824h. The former directs that the states must
have the right to present their views if affected by an interconnection plan, primarily a
right to intervene. The latter section gives the states the right to sit on a board with (he
authority to decide the adequacy of such a plan. Presumably, if a state were appointed to
such a board, it would lose its right to intervene. 18 C.F.R. § 385.1305(g) (1992). Thc
problem could be solved by the creation of joint hearings or conferences or amendment ot
the statute to clear up the latent ambiguity.
127. See supra notes 67-96 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 30: 485. 1993] A Critical Analysis of Joint Board Policy
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
policy considerations that should and can be reflected in the Com-
mission's determinations.128 Fairly presented, more realistic ratio-
nales concerning the political constraints on cooperative action
should withstand judicial review since they comport with the inter-
ests that the Commission should consider under the statute.129
V. CONCLUSION
The changes suggested by this critique are not great. Likewise,
they do not present significant costs to an administrative process.
That process currently places a premium on intervention by the
states and every other party that might have an interest in the pro-
ceeding. While marginally satisfying the representational interest,
intervention comes with the political costs of perceived intransigence
and insensitivity to local concerns. Much of that political cost can be
avoided by greater regional participation, and one benefit might be
better decision making.
128. See EDLEY, supra note 104, at 169-212.
129. Whether the administrative law model is traditional or representational, the
revised policy would withstand review. Under the former, the decision comports with the
legislative directive.to involve the states in decisions which affect them. Under the latter,
the representational interest is clearly satisfied by direct participation. Stewart, supra
note 105, at 1674-76, 1757.

